BookCard:Herbert Gintis (2000), Game Theory Evolving.
書誌情報 ;Title :Game theory evolving : a problem-centered introduction to modeling strategic behavior ;Author :Herbert Gintis ;Publisher :Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©2000. ;Edition/Format :Book : English ;Document Type :Book, Internet Resource ;All Authors / Contributors :Herbert Gintis ;ISBN : 0691009422 9780691009421 0691009430 9780691009438 ;OCLC Number : 42733679 ;Description : xxxv, 531 p. : ill. ; 26 cm. ;Responsibility : Herbert Gintis. 目次 （＠マークは「京都大学依田研究室2000年度ゲーム理論テキスト輪読会」の担当者とレジュメ） Preface xxi Suggestions for Instructors xxx I Concepts and Problems Capter 1 Game Theory: A Lexicon for Strategic Interaction 3 Capter 2 Leading from Strength: Eliminating Dominated Strategies 15 Capter 3 Playing It Straight: Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria 27 Capter 4 Catching 'em Off Guard: Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria 54 Capter 5 Moving through the Game Tree: Subgames, Incredible Threats, and Trembling Hands 90 Capter 6 Repeated Games, Trigger Strategies, and Tacit Collusion 118 Capter 7 Biology Meets Economics: Evolutionary Stability and the Birth of Dynamic Game Theory 148 Capter 8 Dynamical Systems and Differential Equations 164 Capter 9 Evolutionary Dynamics 188　＠第9章　小川(レジュメ.pdf) Capter 10 Markov Economies and Stochastic Dynamical Systems 220　＠第10章　手島(レジュメ.doc) Capter 11 Homo reciprocans, Homo egualis, and Other Contributors to the Human Behavioral Repertoire 237　＠第11章　後半　斎藤(レジュメ.doc) Capter 12 Learning Who Your Friends Are: Bayes' Rule and Private Information 284 Capter 13 When It Pays to Be Truthful: Signaling in Games with Friends, Adversaries, and Kin 307 Capter 14 Bosses and Workers, Landlords and Peasants, and Other Principal-Agent Models 332　＠第14章　手島(レジュメ.doc) Capter 15 Bargaining 345　＠第15章　斎藤(レジュメ.doc) Capter 16 Probability and Decision Theory 357 　 II Answers and Hints 395 - 499 Sources for Problems 500 References 501 Index 521 紹介 The study of strategic action (game theory) is moving from a formal science of rational behavior to an evolutionary tool kit for studying behavior in a broad array of social settings. In this problem-oriented introduction to the field, Herbert Gintis exposes students to the techniques and applications of game theory through a wealth of sophisticated and surprisingly fun-to-solve problems involving human (and even animal) behavior. Game Theory Evolving is innovative in several ways. First, it reflects game theory's expansion into such areas as cooperation in teams, networks, the evolution and diffusion of preferences, the connection between biology and economics, artificial life simulations, and experimental economics. Second, the book--recognizing that students learn by doing and that most game theory texts are weak on problems--is organized around problems, and introduces principles through practice. Finally, the quality of the problems is simply unsurpassed, and each chapter provides a study plan for instructors interested in teaching evolutionary game theory. Reflecting the growing consensus that in many important contexts outside of anonymous markets, human behavior is not well described by classical "rationality," Gintis shows students how to apply game theory to model how people behave in ways that reflect the special nature of human sociality and individuality. This book is perfect for upper undergraduate and graduate economics courses as well as a terrific introduction for ambitious do-it-yourselfers throughout the behavioral sciences. (from Publisher description) 便利な情報 *著者のサイトに、 **正誤表がある。誤字脱字が多くて有名な本なので、必ずチェックすること。 **また、第２版(2009)の見本（各章のはじめの方）を見ることができる。 *米国国会図書館サイトで詳細な目次を見ることができる。 Category:ブックカード